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In the Supreme· Court
of the State of IJta.h_
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent, .

v.

Case No. 7762

ROSE DUCINNIE DAVIE,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

·STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts· as stated in the appellant's brief
is acceptable to the ·state. The statute under which this con.;.
viction was had is 103-51-21, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
insofar as it is pertinent to this appeal and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person:

( 1) To keep a house of ill fame resorted to for the
purpose of prostitution or lewdness, or to willfully
reside in such house, or to resort thereto for lewdness;
or,

(2)

*• *
2,

J
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. STATE'S WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, MAN-

DONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE NOT ACCOMPLICES.
II. EVEN ASSUMING WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS,
MANDONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE ACCOMPLICES, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL.
lNG TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY.
III. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE RECORDS ~F THE TELEPHONE.COMPANY,.
THE POWER COMPANY AND THE INSURANCa
AGENT.
I

POINT I
STATE'S WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, MANDON·
ADO, MUIR AND LYMAN. WERE NOT ACCOMPLICES.
The defendant was charged with the crime of keeping a
house of ill fame resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and
lewdness. We do not have a statutory definition of accomplices. Section 10~~-1 . . 43, Utah Code Annotated 1943, defines
who are principals. In the case of State v. Bowman, 92 Utah
540, 70 P. 2d 458, this court stated that the word "accomplice"
has been construed to refer to one who is or could be charged
. as a principal with the defendant on trial.
Defendant acknowledges that the witnesses could not
be charged with the crime of keeping a house of prostitution,
but asserts, apparently, that defendant and the· witnesses could
4
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1 1

have been charged under that part of the; statute making it an
offense to ttresort thereto for lewdness." Defendant, however,
was not charged with resorting, and even if the ~itriesses could
have been charged under the separate offense of r~sorting
"thereto for lewdness" that would not make them accomplices
in this case.
California has a statute defining· principals which. is sub~
stantially similar to ours.
Section 11.11 of the Penal Code of California which
requires that testimony of an accomplice be corroborated before
a conviction can be had was amended in 1915 to define an
accomplice as follows:
An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable
to prosecution for the identical offense charged against
defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony
of the accomplice is given.
This amendment came about as a result of the decision of
People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.)
704, which is cited by defendant. Since the time of the amendment the courts of California have given a much stricter arid
restrictive definition of an accomplice. The case of People v.
Clapp, 151 P. 2d 237 (1944), 24 Cal. 2d 75~, is an illustration.
This was a case where the defendant had_ performed an abortion upon one of the witnesses, and two ()ther witnesses hacl
watched the operation. It was aserted on appeal that the two
witnesses who were present during the operation were accomplices, and, therefore, their testimony neede~ to be corroborated as required by Section 11.11 of the Penal Code.
The court stated:

5
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*- * .* ·Itjs necessary to determine whether sections
31 and, 971 of the Penal- Code or other provisions of
the. criminal law subject the witness to . prosecution
undet the provisions that the defendant is .accused ·of
violating, or whether the acts of the witness participating in the transaction constitute a sep~rate and dis. tinct offense~ If cf statutory provision so ·defines a crime
that the participation of two or more persons is necessary for. its'. commission, . but . ·.prescribes punishment
for the acts of certain participants only, and another
statutory provision prescribes punishment for the acts
of participat;1ts not subject to the first provision, it is
clear that the latter are criminally liable only under
the specific prov:ision relating to their participation in
the criminal_ transaction. The specific provision making
the acts of· participation in the transaction. a separate
offense sup~rcedes the general provision in section 31
of the Penal Code that such acts subject the participant
in. t~e crime of the accused to prosecution for its· commtsston.
The reasoning of this case was extended in the case of People
v. Grayson, 189 P. 2d 285, s·Cal. App. 2d 516 (1948). The
appellant was convicted of receiving and holding a wager on
a horse race.· On· appeal he complained that a witness, one·
Pease, who placed .··a bet 'vith the defendant, was an accomplice. In this case there were not two separate statutes covering the offenses, but section 37a of the Penal Code of California had s·everat··subdivisions. Subdivision 3 made it illegal
fot a person to receive bets. Subdivision .6 of the section made
it illegal for a person to offer or place a· bet. The court reasoned:

* * * -so, here,

since the act of placing ~ bet, without which, of course, the bet could not be received by
another, was pu~ishable as a separate .offense under
subdivision·· 6, · and . was not specifically under sub6
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division 3, it \vas not punishable- ·under· section 31,
and Pease was not an accomplice of appellant who received the bet. The testimony of Pease was sufficient,
without corroboration, to prove the offense charged in
count one.
The defendant in the present case is ~barged with keeping.a house of ill fame. Section 103-51-21,. Utah Code Annotated 1943, has several subdivisions. Within subdivision 1
there are several clauses, to-wit:
It shall be unlawful for any person:
( 1) To keep a house of ill fam.e resorted ~o for the
purpose of prostitution or lewdness, o~ •to willfully re- side in such house, or to resort thereto for le~dness;
It is the contention of the State that each ··of these clauses is
a separate and distinct offense just as though they were set
out in separate subdivisions or separate sections. Consequently,
if the above-mentioned witnesses were guilty of a crime it
\vas a separate and distinct offense-that of r~sortiqg to a house
of ill fame for lewdness.
It has been held in Iowa that a woman-engaged i~ prostitution in a house of ill fame is not an · accomplice of the
person charged with the management of the house.· This was
based upon the theory that ther~ was no affirmative participation in the actual management. The Iowa statute defining
principal is similar. to ours. In State. v. Anderson, 38 :NW 662,
the defendant ~as convicted of .keeping 3: house _of ill -fame.
Four women who stayed in the ·house testified to numerous
acts of prostitution in t~e place and under the supervision of
the defendant who received part of the remuner~tio_n paid to
the women by the men patro~izing the_ ho~se. Two of these
7
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women did not assist 1n its management. The other two
did_-such wo~k as. night clerking, serving drinks and hustling.
The lower court failed to instruct. that the two who did not
ha~e any control of .the manageJ?ent of the house were accom~
plices. The court did instruct tht~t the other two w~re accom~
plices and that the statute of Iowa required corroboration. The
appellate court said:
.

.

.

'' * * * Two

of these witnesses were intimates of
the place but did ·not assist in its management, therefore they were not to be deemed accomplices. Ho\Vever, there is evidence from which the jury could find
two other \Vitnesses were accomplices. (Page 665).
See also People v. \Vebb, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 554; reversed on
other grounds, 26 N.Y.S. 2d ~·86; People v. Swift, 261 App.
Div. 808, 23 N.Y.S. 1022; Jackson v. United States, D. C.
App.- ( 1919), 48 App. D. C. 269; State v. Chauvet 1900, 111
Iowa 687, 83 N.W. 717, 51 L.R.A. 630, 82 Am. St. Rep. 359;
Stone v. State (1919), 47 Tex. C. Cr. 575, 85 S.W. 808;
People v. Richardson ( 1917), 22 N.Y. 103, 118 N.E. 514;
16 C.J. 1388, page 681. It should be noted that New York,
Iov1a and California have statutes which are substantially
similar to the State~of Utah's defining principal and requiring
corroboration of accomplices' testimony.
It is not contended that these four v1itnesses in the present
case ·had any active management in the keeping of the house
of ill fame which the defendant is ·accused of operating. It
is, therefore, .submitted that they were not accomplices any
more than 'vas the prostitute in the Iowa case.
8
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POINT II
EVEN ASSUMING WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS,
MANDONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE ACCOMPLICES, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY.
This court in the case of State v. Simpson~ 236 P. 2d
1077, decided October 26, 1951, squarely met the question of whether the refusal of a trial judge to instruct the
jury regarding the testimony of accomplices and the need
for corroboration thereof was in error.
As to the third point, while it is perhaps a better
practice for the trial court to give a cautionary instruction regarding the testimony of an accomplice, it is
generally held that this is a matter which lies within
the discretion of the trial judge, and it· is not reversible
error to fail to give such an instruction. People v. Ruiz,
144 Cal. 251, 77 P. 907; Commonwealth v. Beal, 314
Mass. 210, 50 N.E. 2d 14; State v. Gaddis, 131 N.J.L.
44, 34 A.2d 735; Gordon v. State, 188 Miss. 708, 196
So. 507; U. S. v. Block, 2 Cir., 88 P.2d 618; and People
v. Nathanson, 389 Ill. 311, 59 N.E. 2d 677. p. 1083.
The instructions usually given in criminal cases as to
the weight of testimony and the credibility of witnesses was
given in this case. Instruction No. 13 is particularly in point.
You are the sole judges of all questions of fact, of
the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the .
witnesses. In weighing the testimony you may consider the bias, if any is shown, of any witness to testify for or against any party, his interest, if any, in the
· result of the trial, his appearance on the witness stand,

9
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and any probable· motive which he may -have to tell
that \Vhich is not true; you may COnsider the reasonableneSS of the witnesses' statements, their apparent
··frankness ~nd candor, <?r the want of it, their opportunity to kn~ow and understand, and their capacity to
ren1ember, and from all the facts- and. circumstancesgiven in evicience dete,.-mine. what weight ought to pe
given to t~~ testimony of ariy witnes<s.
There vvas ample corroborative evidence coming from
police officers Garside (R. 32-61) (R. 133, 136), Bennett
'(R. 104-136), Wilson. (R. 127), and Henderson (R. 106),
and the other witnesses.

POINT III

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE RECORDS OF THE TELEPHONE COMPANY,
THE POWER COMPANY AND THE INSURANCE
AGENT.
The record of the telephone .company was identified by
the unit manager of the Ogden office. He identified them as
records of the company which showed telephone listings of
the users of the se~vice of the company. He stated that they
were from his office, and that he had access_ to them (R. 82).
As to the power company's records the person identifying
those records stated he was an employee of the power company, that he took the records from the files of . the power
company. of which he had charge, and that it was his duty to
keep records of the users of the power company's service (R.
103-104:).
10
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This state has recognized th~ "shop book" rule in several
cases, a list of which is given in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co.. , 96 U. 331, 85 P. 2d 819, 822. In the case of Bohlke
v. Wright, 93 P. 2d 321, 200 Wash. 3·74 ( 1939), it was urged
that it was error to allow the admission of the record of a telephone conversation. The divisional manager of the telephone
company was allowed to identify the record.
The slip of paper was part of the records of the
t~lephone company, and as such was entitled to be
admitted in evidence. Citations omitted.) p. 32=··
See also Pinkerton's National Detective Agency v. Rosedale
Silk Co., 184 Atl. 282, 121 Pa. Supra 496.
The records of the insurance company were identified by
Mr. Harold Tribe, who shared business office space with the
insurance agent, William J. Holmes, who at the time of the
trial, was out of the state. He testified that they shared offices,
that they had had occasion to assist each other in various ways
and were familiar with the records in each other's business.
He identified an insurance diary which was kept in the files
at "our office." On cross examination he testified that he had
an occasion to take and replace the record in the insurance
company's files, and that the record came from the file tn
their office (R. 99-102).
The necessity of verifying the correctnes~ of entries
by the bookkeeper, clerk or other person who made the
entries in a book of accounts is obviated or necessarily
relaxed when such person has died, has become and
remains at the time of the trial, insane or physically
unable to attend as a witness, is beyond the jurisdiction
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the court or otherwise unavailable as a witness.
* * * . 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 1070.
It is submitted that Mr. Tribe had ample opportunity to be
familiar with the records of the insurance company inasmuch
as he had a joint office with this insurance company and had
assisted the agent thereof in various ways.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court did not
err in refusing to instruct on accomplices' testimony or in
admitting into the evidence the records heretofore referred to.
Respectfully,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
J. RICHARD BELL,
Assistant Attorney General
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